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Abstract
The literature on vouchers often concludes that a vouchers-based
system cannot be the outcome of a majority vote. This paper shows
that, when the value of vouchers and who is entitled to receive them
are fixed exogenously, the majority of voters are in favour of selec-
tive vouchers. On top of that, as long as the introduction of vouchers
does not undermine the existence of the public school system, intro-
ducing selective vouchers induces a Pareto improvement. Middle class
agents are the only one using vouchers in equilibrium, while the poor-
est agents in the economy profit from the reduction in public school
congestion.
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1 Introduction
Most western countries publicly provide some private goods, such as educa-
tion. These goods are financed through taxes and oﬀered to all citizens at
a lower than competitive price and possibly for free. Households can choose
between the public and private supply.
For some of these goods, it is possible to supplement public service con-
sumption with a private one, while for others it is not (either for technical
or legal reasons). It is common in the literature to assume that education
belongs to this second group of goods. In a first-best world, each consumer
chooses his optimal level of quality, which is a priori diﬀerent for each agent.
One drawback of the public school system is that, for equity reasons, all
students in a public school receive the same service regardless of their pref-
erences.
The public service is often congested.1 Oﬀering incentives to students to
move to the private sector reduces congestion but also the political support
for a high quality public service.2 It is interesting to investigate whether
citizens would agree on the introduction of vouchers.3 A voting model seems
appropriate to forecast how a change in the level of taxation and the use of
instruments such as vouchers would be perceived by voters.
The mainstream literature on education generally concludes either that
the introduction of vouchers is not welfare improving, or that it cannot be the
outcome of a majority vote unless some additional features are introduced
1Clearly, public schools are not always congested, but several empirical studies show
that this is the case in several countries (e.g. Duncombe, Miner, and Ruggiero (1995),
Kokkelenberg, Dillon, and Christy (2008), Ruggiero (1999), Smet (2001) and Wössmann
and West (2006)).
2If the quality of public school increases, the intensity of support increases too for the
people attending it, but here we consider support in terms of number of voters. The people
moving to the private sector don’t have a direct interest in a high-quality public school.
3Vouchers are a sort of cheque exploitable only to purchase private education. They
can be "universal" (everybody is entitled to receive them) or "selective" (they are oﬀered
only to a subset of the population).
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(e.g. peers eﬀects). In my paper I show that this is not the case and that, as
long as the value of vouchers is chosen exogenously, their introduction can
lead to a Pareto improvement.
A major contribution to the field comes from Epple and Romano (1996a).
Most of the successive literature, as well as my paper, can be considered as
an extension of their model. Agents vote over the tax to finance public
school; consumption of education varies amongst agents in terms of quality
rather than quantity. Epple and Romano (1996a) show that to ensure the
existence of an equilibrium a single crossing condition has to be imposed and
identify two alternative conditions: Slope Rising in Income (SRI) and Slope
Decreasing in Income (SDI).4 Under SRI, at the equilibrium, named "ends
against the middle", the richest and poorest households push to reduce the
tax, while the medium class does the opposite. Vouchers are not considered.
In my paper I only consider the SDI case, for which they conclude that the
median voter is always decisive and the poorest in the society form a coalition
facing the richest.
In my model, based on Epple and Romano (1996a) and Chen and West
(2000), I consider the introduction of selective vouchers as a possible way
to reduce congestion (by reducing the price of private education, vouchers
might allow some voters to consume it) and to increase the quality level in
the public sector.
Chen and West (2000) carry out a positive analysis of the school system,
using the same model as Epple and Romano (1996a). Their aim is to com-
pare systems with universal, selective and without vouchers under SDI. The
upper threshold to receive selective vouchers is the median income, while
in my model it is higher, and the voucher value is equal to the (constant)
marginal cost of education, while in my model it is the average its cost. The
article concludes that the majority always prefer the no-voucher model to
the universal one, while the decisive voter is indiﬀerent between the selective
and the no-voucher frameworks and there are no welfare diﬀerences. The
4For more details on these conditions, see footnote 6 and also page 9.
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diﬀerences in results with respect to my paper come from the attributes of
the selective voucher.
To show that selective vouchers are welfare improving and they are sup-
ported by a voters’ majority, I exogenously fix their value and the subset of
people entitled to receive them. Agents vote over the tax to finance public
school. My model is more general then Chen and West (2000): I require
neither the cost of public and private education to be the same, nor the mar-
ginal cost of a student to be constant. As in Chen and West (2000), I do
not consider peer eﬀects,5 and I concentrate on the SDI condition.6 Absent
vouchers, my model’s results are identical with those in Epple and Romano
(1996a), which I use as a benchmark. My model shows that in the extreme
case, when most of public school students are attracted by vouchers, the pub-
lic sector collapses and a subset of the population is worse oﬀ. Introducing
vouchers always induces a Pareto improvement in the more realistic case in
which public education continue existing.
Epple and Romano (1998) consider a universal vouchers model with stu-
dents diﬀering in income and ability. They conclude that vouchers’ introduc-
tion is supported by a majority of voters and followed by a fall in congestion;
all their results rely on the presence of peers eﬀects. Best students attend
private schools together with the richest ones. Private schools are attended
by either rich or skilled (or both) students. Only a minority of neither-rich-
5Introducing peer eﬀects would add a noise to my analysis, since it would be impossible
to disentangle the eﬀects of peer eﬀects and of vouchers.
6SDI (Slope Decreasing in Income): this monotonicity condition means that the pre-
ferred tax by an agent decreases in income. There is no empirical evidence showing that
this single crossing property is more realistic than the alternative one (SRI) nor the reverse.
Probably the SRI assumption is more reasonable for countries where the life condition of
poorest are dramatic and they do not care a lot about education, maybe because they even
don’t attend school because even very young people have to work. On the opposite, the
SDI assumption might be more appropriate for countries where poor people are suﬃciently
rich to be able to profit of education and consider it as an investment.
I restricted my attention on SDI to keep the model simpler and I let the SRI case for
future analysis.
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nor-skilful students remain in public schools, where the quality drops along
with students’ utility. The authors also develop a computational model, cal-
ibrated to existing empirical evidence. The market structure and the cost
function in this model are very close to mine.
In what follows, the paper is divided into four sections: section 2 de-
scribes the basic attributes of the model; section 3 illustrates the voting
outcome without vouchers (benchmark case). Section 4 studies the eﬀects of
introducing vouchers, while in section 5 I analyse the results of the vote over
the tax and show under which conditions selective vouchers induce a Pareto
improvement. The last section concludes.
2 The model
I consider a model with two normal goods (the numeraire b and educational
services X) whose basic setting is as follows:
1. Public and private school are mutually exclusive. Subscript P indi-
cates the public sector and R the private one (e.g. XP and XR are
respectively the qualities of public and private education).
2. The mass of voters is normalised to one. Each voter has a pupil at-
tending school. Voters’ type depends only on income ω (density func-
tion f(ω); support ω ∈ [ωmin;ωmax]). I assume the average income
ω =
R ωmax
ωmin
ωf(ω)dω to be greater than the median one (ωmed).7
3. Voters’ utility function (U(X, b)), is separable and strictly concave in
both arguments.8
7Note that, given the normalisation of the population, the average and aggregate income
coincide.
8This assumption is slightly more restrictive than the one ensuring the single crossing
property in Epple and Romano (1996a); the subsequent computations are simplified by
this assumption but results and insights are not aﬀected by it.
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4. To incorporate congestion1 in the model, the school cost function is
convex in the number of students n, so that C(X,n) = F + V (n)X,
with Vn > 0 and Vn,n > 0.9
5. I assume V (np) = (c1np + c2(np)2), where np is the number of students
attending it; thus the cost function isC(XP , np) = F+(c1np + c2(np)2)XP .10
Without loss of generality I consider that only one public institute is
present.11
6. In the educational market, the public sector is the dominant firm while
the private one is the competitive fringe.
7. Each private-school student can decide the level of educational quality
to purchase. The low barriers to entry allow new firms to enter in
the market so that the number of students in each school adjusts to
always be the eﬃcient one (i.e. for each firm i, ni = argmin(C(ni)/ni)).
9The convexity assumption is controversial if considering education as a pure public
good or assuming the cost function to be linear in the number of students. Having an
increasing marginal cost is reasonable when we consider the product sold by schools includ-
ing complementary services (such as school bus, professors oﬃce hours, sport facilities...),
buildings (close to each other) etc. because the cost of these services might be non-linear
(especially in case of capacity constraints). From both Epple and Romano (1998) and
Epple, Romano, and Sieg (2006) it seems to be a correct specification. Lazear (2001)
oﬀers a survey of the literature on how class’ size matters and under which condition it is
correlated with education’s quality/costs.
10This form of cost function, showing decreasing returns to scale, is supported by sev-
eral empirical studies, e.g. Epple and Romano (1998), Epple, Romano, and Sieg (2006),
Kokkelenberg, Dillon, and Christy (2008) and Duncombe, Miner, and Ruggiero (1995).
11This is equivalent to assumpe that all public schools have same number of students
and quality of service.
This is possible with perfectly mobile students and the same budget for each institute
(arbitrage eﬀect), even in presence of idiosyncratic heterogeneity (e.g. diﬀerent average
wealth) and peer eﬀects (whose analysis is beyond the scope of this work).
Passing from the general cost function Ψ(XP , η) = S +
¡
c1η + ψη2
¢
XP (with η the
number of students per institute) with k institutes to this one would be simply a matter
of renaming some variables.
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The quality of one unit of private education XR is defined in order to
normalise the private sector’s price (i.e. q = 1). 12
8. Public education is financed via a proportional income tax t paid by
all citizens and chosen through majority voting. Without loss of gener-
ality, for the sake of simplicity I suppose that the government’s budget
constraint requires balancing only ordinary (variable) costs and the
proportional income tax proceeds.13
9. I assume that tax proceeds are firstly used to finance vouchers.14 The
remaining resources are equally shared among public school students
(thus, all students attending public school receive the same quality of
education XP ).
10. The government proposes a voucher of value v, that a given part of
the population is entitled to use to attend a private school. Denoting
nv the number of people using their voucher in equilibrium, the public
cost of vouchers is nvv.
By assumption 8, the total public (variable) expenditure for education
(c1+ c2np)npXP +nvv must be equal to total public income tω. Rearranging
the budget constraint, the quality of public schools is indirectly determined
by:
12By the free entry assumption, q does not depend on the number of students in the pri-
vate sector. Chen and West (2000) gets the same conclusion through a generic technology
to produce education showing decreasing returns to scale. Epple and Romano (1996a) do
not need to specify the private sector market structure.
13In other words I suppose fixed costs to be covered by ad hoc lump sum taxes. This can
be explained because fixed costs are infrequent and huge thus they might have to be ap-
proved by specific procedures and financed through special public funds. This assumption
does not aﬀect results qualitatively.
14Fixing a minimal expenditure for public school would imply a higher preferred tax,
but it would not qualitatively aﬀect the outcome.
The alternative option (i.e. having total income shared between vouchers and public
school) would imply a much less treatable model without adding special insights nor being
a more realistic assumption.
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XP =
tω − nvv
gnp
(1)
where g = (c1 + c2np) is the per-pupil cost of one unit of public education.
Clearly, since XP cannot be negative, we must ensure that tω ≥ nvv.
Households’ behaviour can be summarized as follows:
• the problem of an agent choosing private school is15
⎧
⎨
⎩
max
XR
U(XR; b)
s.t. b = (1− t)ω −XR + v
His indirect utility can be written (in its reduced form) as UR((1 −
t)ω−X∗R+ v), where X∗R is the optimal level of consumption of private
education. Clearly, since he does not profit from public education, if he
uses vouchers his preferred level of taxation is t = nvvω (the minimum
tax to finance them) and otherwise t = 0 (see figure 1). His utility is
strictly decreasing in the tax.
Figure 1: Preferred tax for agents attending private school.
15Remember that the price of private education q has been normalised to 1. Moreover,
by the definition of voucher, v ≤ XR.
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• The utility function of an agent of income ω attending public school is
U(Xp; b); replacing b by the after tax income and Xp by equation (1),
the indirect utility is:
UP
µ
tω − nvv
gnp
; (1− t)ω
¶
(2)
The preferred level of taxation for this agent is the one that maximises
his utility, i.e. t∗(ω) = argmax
t
UP
³
tω−nvv
gnp
; (1− t)ω
´
. From the FOC it is
possible to indirectly determine how the preferred tax of a voter attending
public school changes with his type/income. Since the utility function is
assumed to be separable in its two arguments, we have that ∂t
∗(ω)
∂ω > 0 if and
only if −ω(1− t)UP22 > UP2 and ∂t
∗(ω)
∂ω < 0 if and only if −ω(1− t)UP22 < UP2 .
These expressions correspond respectively to the SRI and SDI monotonicity
conditions.16
Both conditions are widely accepted in the literature; I assume that the
SDI assumption (depicted in figure 2) holds. This assumption means that the
marginal utility of education is much higher than the one of the numeraire
for low levels of consumption, while the opposite is true when an agent is
consuming a richer bundle. As a consequence, richer people are less eager to
substitute units of the numeraire versus education.
Every agent chooses between public and private school by comparing the
two possible levels of utility he can attain. If an agent prefers public school so
do all the agents with lower income and if another prefers private school so do
all the agents richer than him.17 As a consequence, the poorest households
attend public school while the richer ones prefer private schools.
16Assuming one of the two monotonicity assumption is necessary to ensure the existence
of an equilibrium. For more details on the SRI and SDI assumptions, see footnote 6 and
also Epple and Romano (1996a).
17This is true as long as we compare agents all receiving the voucher or if none of them
receive it.
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Figure 2: Preferred tax under SDI for public school students (linerar proxy).
It is possible to identify the "indiﬀerent voter(s)" bω, i.e. the voter(s)
having the same utility regardless of the type of school attended:
UR ((1− t)ω −X∗R + v) = UP
µ
tω − nvv
gnp
; (1− t)ω
¶
(3)
His identity depends on public school quality and thus on the equilibrium
tax t. Denoting by ω the pivotal voter, the equilibrium tax t depends on ω,
so it is more precise to denote the indiﬀerent voter by bω(t(ω)) or bω(ω) to be
more concise.
The two following lemmas allow us to conclude that, once we identify the
indiﬀerent voter, all richer agents attend private school and the others the
public one.17
Lemma 1 In a given interval ω ∈ [α;ϕ] and for ϕ > β > α, if the agent
ω = β prefers the private system so do all those richer than him (i.e. ω ∈
[β, ϕ]).
Lemma 2 Similarly to the previous lemma, if ω = β prefers the public sys-
tem, so do all the poorer agents (i.e. ω ∈ [α, β]).
The indiﬀerent agent can choose between two bundles: attending public
school he can consume more of the numeraire but less education and vice
10
Figure 3: Moving from public to private school: Engel’s and indiﬀerence
curves.
versa (see fig. 3). From the sketch of the indiﬀerence curves18 one can
see that for an agent with low income (ω < ωˆ) it is preferable to choose
bundle 2 (i.e. attend public school) than choosing the tangency point 1. The
indiﬀerent voter ωˆ can choose the tangency point 3 (attending private school)
or to consume public school choosing bundle 4. Finally for those agents with
suﬃciently high income, the tangency point suggests that the best option is
to consume bundle 5.
Before considering the solution of the model, I consider the situation when
vouchers are not available, which is considered as a benchmark to study the
consequences of the introduction of vouchers.
3 The benchmark case (without vouchers)
When vouchers are not available, this model is the same as in Epple and
Romano (1996a), except that I don’t impose the cost function parameters to
18The line represents the budget constraint and the vertical deviation in correspondence
to the point Xp is due to the fact that everybody can always attend public school and in
that case he can consume all his disposable income to buy the numeraire, thus there is a
jump in his consumption.
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be the same for the public and private sectors.19
The equilibrium results for the no-voucher case are denoted by the super-
script nv. Equation (1) becomesXnvp =
tω
gnvnnvp
and (3) is UR ((1− t)ω −X∗R) =
UP
³
tω
gnvnnvp
; (1− t)ω
´
.
Figure 4: Preferred tax under SDI and no voucher.
Under the SDI assumption, the median voter is pivotal (ω = ωmed); from
figure (4) it is intuitive to see why.20 This means that the voting outcome in
the no voucher case is tnv = t(ωmed); all and only agents with income lower
than the indiﬀerent voter bω attend public school. The number of households
attending public school is nnvp (tnv) =
R ?ω
ωmin
f(ω)dω = F (bω).21
19For more details and proofs of this section results, the reader can see Epple and
Romano (1996a) and Glomm and Ravikumar (1998).
20The preferences over the tax being weakly decreasing in income, the poorer households
would prefer a higher level of taxation than the richer ones. Any proposed t < t(ωmed) can
be an equilibrium because all households with income ω < ωmed prefer t(ωmed). Similarly,
all tax proposals t > t(ωmed) are defeated by a majority of voters composed by all agents
with income ω ≥ ωmed.
21Note that agents, in order to forecast the quality of public school, anticipate the
value of nnvp while choosing to attend public or private school and thus to vote for a
given level of taxation. It is crucial to ensure that in equilibrium the proportion of voters
opting for public services coincides with agents’ expectations. Glomm and Ravikumar
(1998)’s proposition 2 proves that it always exists a nnvp solving (3) and being unique.
The conditions under which Glomm and Ravikumar (1998) proposition 2 holds are not
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The only diﬀerence compared to Epple and Romano (1996a) is that public
and private school prices (respectively g and q) in my article are not assumed
to be the same. All their results concerning the SDI case hold here simply
assuming g = q. On top of that, even when g 6= q, their results are still
qualitatively applicable, only the identity of the indiﬀerent voter will diﬀer.
In particular, with respect to Epple and Romano (1996a), if g > q the quality
of public school is lower and so is bω (i.e. the indiﬀerent agent between public
and private school is poorer) and the opposite is true for g < p.
In the next sections, these results are used as a benchmark to grasp the
consequences of the introduction of vouchers.
4 Introducing vouchers
The policy maker proposes a voucher of magnitude v = t
nvω
nnvp
to agents with
income below bω(tnv(ωmed)) (i.e. those attending public school in the bench-
mark case) if they attend a private school.22
The public budget constraint (1) can be rewritten as
XP =
µ
t− nv
nnvp
tnv
¶
ω
gnp
(4)
We can expect some agents entitled to receive the voucher to shift to
the private sector. Moreover, this implies a reduction in congestion so the
quality of public school might increase, attracting some students previously
attending a private institute.
Since the price of private education is no longer the same for all agents, it
is possible to identify up to two possible indiﬀerent agents: one among voters
receiving vouchers and another within the others.
It is preferable to consider separately the two diﬀerent groups of agents
[ωmin;ωvmax] and [ωvmax;ωmax]. Lemmas (1) and (2) allow us to construct four
restrictive and apply in all the frameworks I analyse. In particular they need F (ω) to be
a continuous function increasing in ω and bω(ω) has to be decreasing in np.
22The value of the voucher is strictly smaller than the marginal cost of a student at
equilibrium in the case without vouchers, i.e. t
nvω
nnvp
< (c1+2c2n
nv
p )t
nvω
(c1+c2nnvp )nnvp
.
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(possibly empty) subsets:23 in particular for each of the two previous groups
of agents we can have some voters preferring public education and some
preferring the privately provided counterpart.bωL(t) ∈ [ωmin;ωvmax] is the income level for which
UR ((1− t)ω −X∗R + v) = UP
µ
tω − nvv
gnp
; (1− t)ω
¶
(5)
while bωR(t) ∈ [ωvmax;ωmax] is such that
UR ((1− t)ω −X∗R) = UP
µ
tω − nvv
gnp
; (1− t)ω
¶
(6)
The two previous equations mean that bωL and bωR are the income levels for
which an agent is indiﬀerent between private and public education. ClearlybωL + v ≤ bω ≤ bωR.
The two critical levels of income bωL and bωR can also be seen in Figure
5, which shows qualitatively how utility changes with income for an agent
attending private or public school, both without and with vouchers. The
quality of public school in the graph is fixed and Xp > Xnvp .
Figure 5: How utility changes with income
23Later on I will give the existence conditions for the indiﬀerent agents and thus the
four subsets’ bounds.
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From the graph it is clear that, if the intersection between UR(ω + v)
and UP (Xp;ω) were to the right with respect to the one between UR(ω) and
UP (Xnvp ;ω) then bωL would be greater than bω. Thus, it would not belong
to the required interval and all agents in [ωmin;ωvmax] would attend public
school. Likewise, all agents with income greater than bω prefer to consume
private education when UR(ω) and UP (Xp;ω) do not cross to the right of bω.
When both thresholds exist, there are four groups of agents, whose pre-
ferred choice is represented in Figure 6.
Figure 6: Intervals and choices
Having defined bωL and bωR, it is now possible to precisely define nv and
np. The first one is the number of agents using the voucher at equilibrium
while the second one is the number of agents attending public school, thus:
nv =
R ?ω(tnv)
?ωL f(ω)dω and np =
R ?ωL
ωmin
f(ω)dω +
R ?ωR
?ω(tnv) f(ω)dω.
24
The following propositions and their corollaries prove that bωL and bωR
exist, that is: bωL ∈ [ωmin;ωvmax] and bωR ∈ [ωvmax;ωmax].
Proposition 1 If, ceteris paribus, the quality of public school increases, the
preferred tax for a given level of income falls. Thus the same pivotal voter
might choose diﬀerent tax levels according to the framework.
Corollary 1 If Xp > Xnvp then t(ωmed) < tnv(ωmed) (i.e. if the quality of
public school with vouchers is higher than without and the median voter is
pivotal in both cases, the tax burden decreases)
24Remind that nnvp is the number of people attending public school in the no-voucher
case and it is defined at page 12.
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Proposition 2 If bωL = bω, then bωR = bω and we are back to the case without
vouchers. Moreover it cannot be that bωL > bω.
Corollary 2 A necessary and suﬃcient condition to have an equilibrium
diﬀerent from the no-voucher case is that bωL < bω.
Corollary 3 The number of students attending public school when vouchers
are available is always weakly smaller than in the case of no-voucher, i.e.
gnp ≤ gnvnnvp with strict inequality as long as bωL < bω.
Proposition 3 The quality of public school in case of vouchers is larger than
without them (XP > Xp) if and only if bωR > bω. If Xp ≤ Xnvp , then bωR = bω.
Corollary 4 The voting outcome tax can never be higher than the one pre-
ferred by the median voter (his preferred tax is the highest that might be sup-
ported by at least half of the population). Since bωR > bω only when Xp > Xnvp ,
if we observe bωR > bω, the total number of agents attending public school has
necessarily to be smaller than in the case without vouchers (np < nnvp ).
Proposition 4 The equilibrium public school quality under vouchers is al-
ways greater or equal to the one without vouchers (for a given level of taxa-
tion), i.e. Xp ≥ Xnvp , with strict inequality when bωL < bω.
Proof. See the appendix for the proofs of propositions 1,2, 3 and 4.
As a consequence of these propositions, we conclude that either bωL =bωR = ωvmax (vouchers are ineﬀective), or bωL < ωvmax < bωR.
5 The vote over the tax
The tax to finance public school is chosen by households through majority
voting. Diﬀerent scenarios are possible:25
25Recall that the preferred tax of an agent depends on his choice over public and private
education but also on the opportunity to receive a voucher when choosing the private
school.
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• the preferred tax is decreasing in income for agents attending public
school (SDI assumption).
• the preferred tax is t = 0 for private school students not using vouchers.
• t = nvvω is the preferred tax of private school students using vouchers;
this is exactly the minimum tax to finance the voucher system.26 With
this level of taxation, strictly lower than the one preferred by any public
school student, public education disappears.
The voting process outcome depends on the distribution of income and
mainly on the relative position of bωL with respect to ωmed. I analyse sep-
arately the cases bωL ≥ ωmed (subsection (5.1)), when introducing vouchers
always induces a Pareto improvement, and bωL < ωmed (subsection (5.2)),
when we observe a Pareto improvement only as long as the public school
system does not collapse, otherwise a minority of the population might be
worse oﬀ.
5.1 The case of bωL ≥ ωmed
Restricting our attention to the case when bωL ∈ [ωmed; bω),27 the outcome of
the vote is precisely t = t(ωmed). In fact, all agents with income ω < ωmed
(by definition half of the population) ask for a tax increase with respect to
t = t(ωmed), while all agents with income ω ∈ (ωmed;ωmax] are favourable
to a decrease in the equilibrium tax.28 This means that the median voter
is pivotal. Figure 7 represents agents’ preferred tax in the case of vouchers
when bωL ≥ ωmed.
26Remind that here vouchers size is fixed, thus voting for a higher tax would be useless
for them.
27If bωL = bω (that is, given the utility function, vouchers are not suﬃciently attractive
and in equilibrium any agent use them) we are back to the no-voucher case and the
introduction of vouchers is ineﬀective (see proposition 2).
28This is due to the SDI assumption and because part of agents with income ω > ωmed
attends private school.
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Figure 7: Agents’ preferred tax
Note that, even though the median voter is again decisive, by proposition
(1) his preferred tax level is lower than in the no-voucher case: t(ωmed) <
tnv(ωmed). Moreover the public budget constraint is relaxed and the quality of
public school necessarily increases.29 Part of this eﬀect is oﬀset by the arrival
of some new students previously attending private school and attracted by
the higher public school quality, thus the subset ω ∈ [bω; bωR] is non empty. By
proposition (3) and its corollary, we know that the number of agents moving
from public school is higher than the one of students moving to it and that
the final eﬀect is an increase in the quality of the public service (financed
through tax proceeds net of vouchers expenditure).
From a welfare standpoint, we observe a Pareto improvement. Intuitively,
introducing vouchers the quality of public schools increases making public
school students better oﬀ. Moreover the tax burden falls, so all citizens
are better oﬀ. By the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preferences (WARP), all
agents changing behaviour while the previous bundle is still aﬀordable must
be better oﬀ.
29Since voucher value is lower than the marginal cost of the most expensive public
school students, convincing them to consume private education makes the public budget
constraint less binding and increases the quality of the public service.
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To be more rigorous, for bωL < bω, utility increases for all agents when
introducing vouchers:
• [ωmin; bωL]: these agents always opt for public school. The quality of
public school increases (proposition 4). Since both their disposable
income and the public school quality increase, their utility increases as
well.
• [bωL; bω]: they move from public to private education and use vouchers.
If they stuck to public education they would increase their utility (sim-
ilarly to agents in [ωmin; bωL]). If they decide to opt out from public
school, by WARP it must be that their utility from attending private
school is even higher.
• (bω; bωR): The bundle previously consumed is still aﬀordable. If they
modify their choice, by the WARP it means that the new bundle is
preferred to the previous one.
• [bωR;ωmax]: all the agents in this interval attend private school in both
cases. The price they pay to attend private school is the same and the
tax decreased. As a consequence, all these households are better oﬀ in
the voucher case.
To sum up, when the introduction of vouchers is ineﬀective (i.e. bωL =bω = bωR) agents are indiﬀerent and when bωL ∈ [ωmed; bω) the selective voucher
system strictly Pareto dominates the no-voucher one.
5.2 The case of bωL < ωmed
When many voters have an income close to bω and (given the utility func-
tion) vouchers are particularly attractive, the introduction of vouchers im-
plies changes in the behaviour of a great number of consumers. All voters
with income in the interval ω ∈ [bωL; bω] move to the private sector.
If bωL(ωmed) < ωmed, the poorest part of the population (which is attend-
ing public school) is not numerous enough to form a majority. The shift
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from public to private education implies again (ceteris paribus) an increase
in the public service quality which attracts a group of voters (ω ∈ [ω; bωR])
who were previously attending a private school. With respect to the previ-
ous case (section 5.1) we have an additional element to take into account: if
people willing to attend public school are not able to form a coalition of at
least half of the population (that is, if
R ?ωL
ωmin
f(ω)dω +
R ?ωR
?ω f(ω)dω < 50%)
public school has not enough support and it collapses. Thus the relative size
of each group with respect to the others determines the voting outcome.
Let us define ω ∈ (bω; bωR] as the income level for which R ?ωLωmin f(ω)dω +R ω
?ω f(ω)dω = 50%
30. Intuitively the income ω represents the agent whose
preferred tax is the "median preferred-tax". This domain of existence ensures
that, if it exists then the agent ω attends public school. Agents’ preferred
tax is summarised in figure 8.
Figure 8: Agents’ preferred tax
The existence of ω implies that public school students are forming a coali-
tion able to set the equilibrium tax. The group in favour of no tax is always
small enough not to influence the vote outcome alone: when people attending
public school are representing more than half of the population (ω exists),
30This is equivalent to saying that
R ωmed
?ωL f(ω)dω =
R ω
?ω f(ω)dω.
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they choose the equilibrium tax, otherwise the tax is chosen by the group of
agents attending private school and profiting of the voucher (and set to the
minimum level to finance vouchers: t = nvvω ).
The equilibrium when the majority of voters attend public school
If ω ∈ [bω; bωR], by construction ω is pivotal: all agents with income belonging
to the intervals [ωmin; bωL] and [bω ;ω] prefer a higher tax than ω, and by
construction they represent half of the population. Those in [bωL; bω] and
[ω; bωR] would prefer a lower but positive tax; the remaining (ω > bωR) ask for
no tax at all. Given that ω > ωmed, by the SDI assumption the equilibrium
tax decreases with respect to equilibria in sections (3) or (5.1).
For the existence of this equilibrium, it is necessary for bωR to be greater
than bω (otherwise ω /∈ [bω; bωR]). By proposition (3) we can conclude that
quality of public education has necessarily increased and it follows that a
strict Pareto improvement occurred.
All agents’ disposable income increased (t(ω) < tnv(ωmed)), thus agents
attending a private school (i.e. ω ∈ [bωL; bω] and ω > bωR) are necessarily better
oﬀ than without vouchers. The poorest agents in the population (ω < bωL)
pay less taxes and receive a better public service.
People in ω ∈ [bω; bωR] could stick to the private market and consume a
better bundle with respect to the one consumed without vouchers (since the
tax decreased), if they move to the public sector, by WARP we can conclude
that they are better oﬀ.
All agents being strictly better oﬀ, we conclude that in this framework
the introduction of vouchers lead to a strict Pareto improvement.
The equilibrium when the majority of voters do not attend public
school When agents willing to attend public school are less than 50%,
the decisive voter belongs to the group of people attending private school
and profiting of the voucher. The minimum tax to finance vouchers for all
agents entitled to receive them (t = n
nv
p v
ω ) wins any pairwise comparison.
Replacing v by its value we obtain t = n
nv
p v
ω = t
nv. Every former student of
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the public school is receiving the average social cost of a public student in
the no voucher case.
For this solution to be a stable equilibrium at least half of the population
has to be better oﬀ, otherwise this level tax could not win against the proposal
of having no vouchers. All people with income ω > bω are indiﬀerent, since
the tax does not change with respect to the benchmark.
People with income ω ∈ [bωL; bω] are always better oﬀ (by WARP).
Concerning people with income ω < bωL, they all receive the same voucher
to be spent for private education. Three frameworks are possible for them:
1. Private school market price (q) is lower than the average cost of pro-
ducing public education (AC(XP )) in the no-voucher case. It is socially
optimal to dismantle public school and distribute vouchers. Agents are
better oﬀ: this solution is a Pareto improving equilibrium and public
school disappears.
2. q = AC(XP ). They are indiﬀerent (they consume the same amount of
both goods). This equilibrium weakly Pareto dominates the no-voucher
case and public school disappears.
3. q > AC(XP ). They are strictly worse oﬀ (they consume the same
quantity of numeraire but receive a worse educational service). Here
a minority of the population is worse oﬀ (ω < bωL), another is better
oﬀ (ω ∈ [bωL; bω]) and the remaining (ω > bω) are indiﬀerent. For this
framework to be an equilibrium (i.e. for voters to accept the intro-
duction of vouchers), at least half of voters should agree on vouchers,
which means that a substantial part of the richest agents has to form
a coalition with the middle class against the lower class.
6 Conclusions
The aim of this work was to investigate the implications of introducing se-
lective vouchers and in particular if this change would be accepted by the
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majority of voters. The main contributions of this work are to show:
1. that the usual conclusion that the median voter is always decisive under
the assumption of SDI is not robust to the introduction of vouchers.
2. that in addition to the known types of coalition ("lower class versus
higher class" and "middle class versus the others") we can have a third
type of coalition where part of the bottom-middle class joins the coali-
tion of the richest agents to ask for a reduction in taxes while the
top-middle class forms a coalition with the poorest voters to increase
taxes.
3. that the introduction of vouchers always induces a Pareto improvement
unless if, introducing them, the public sector collapses and meanwhile
the market price of private education is higher than the average cost
of producing public education. In this case the poorest subset of the
population would be hurt by the introduction of vouchers.
4. that the introduction of vouchers should always be supported by a large
majority (under the hypothesis of rational agents).31
5. the middle class is the one who directly profits from vouchers; the
poorest class is the one bearing their costs when public school col-
lapses. The richest class always weakly profits from the introduction
of vouchers (through taxes reduction).
My model is qualitatively robust to diﬀerent specifications (such as Con-
stant Return to Scale production functions) as long as we choose the value
of the voucher exogenously at a value high enough to attract public students
but smaller than their cost to the society.
These results seem to show that the introduction of vouchers should be
welcomed by voters; nevertheless in many western countries (especially in
31The majority of voters always profits from the introduction of vouchers; in most cases,
all agents in the society do.
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Europe) vouchers are not very popular. In Switzerland a referendum against
vouchers has been voted, in Italy the debate over vouchers has been almost
immediately stopped because of the strong hostility showed by many political
parties. Which are the reasons for that? Probably a combination of diﬀerent
factors generated this aversion towards vouchers: on the one hand, especially
in certain countries, private institutes have religious (and often even political)
orientations and vouchers are perceived as a way to subsidise that credo or
a way to diﬀuse specific cultures or principles.
Another reason for the failure of vouchers in Europe might be that gen-
erally only universal vouchers have been proposed and, as we know from the
literature, universal vouchers are more likely to decrease the quality of the
public service and reduce redistribution.
Finally, a more substantial problem concerns the value of the voucher. A
voucher of small amount is ineﬀective and a too large one implies that the
public sector is no longer supported by the majority of the population. In my
model a benevolent social planner fixes the value of the voucher at a value for
which the public budget constraint is relaxed when some students use them.
If we let people decide over the value of vouchers, we can expect to have very
diﬀerent results, compared to those of my model, in particular it is possible
for the vouchers’ value to be higher than the public-school-student’s social
cost or so small that nobody would be interested in using them.
Appendix
A The eﬀects of a change in the tax
Most variables are aﬀected by a change in the income tax. Intuitively, if the
tax rate falls the first impact on the model is that on the one side the public
investment in education (tω) falls and, on the other hand, the disposable
income ((1 − t)ω) of all the agents increases. Both these eﬀects imply that
opting for private school becomes more attractive. Concerning the first one,
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the reasons are obvious, while for the second one they are slightly more subtle:
an increase in the disposable income leads to an increase in the consumption
of b for everybody, but since the quantity of b consumed by people attending
public school is higher, by the concavity of the utility function, the increase
in utility for people attending public school is lower than for those preferring
private education. Since private school becomes more attractive, a greater
number of agents switches from the public to the private system (which
means that the income of the two indiﬀerent voters decreases). The number
of voters using vouchers increases, tightening even more the public budget
constraint. Simultaneously, the number of people attending public school
having fallen, the per-capita public expenditure increases (since gnp drops)
making public education more attractive.
To sum up, the impact on the quality of public school from a change in the
tax is a priori undetermined. On the one side, a drop in the tax rate implies
that the budget available for public school is lower. On the other side this
provokes a decrease in the number of people attending public school (both
because public school becomes less attractive and because agents’ disposable
income increases). When ∂Xp∂t ≥ 0, it means that a reduction in the tax
rate decreases public expenditure for education and the consequent shrinkage
in the number of people attending public school is not enough to oﬀset it
(in other words, demand for public school is inelastic), thus the per-capita
expenditure will also plunge. The reverse is true for ∂Xp∂t < 0.
B Proof of proposition (1)
For a given revenue eω, the preferred tax t(eω) = argmax
t
UP ( tω−nvvgnp ; (1− t)eω).
If, for any reason, the first argument (Xp) increases, its marginal utility
of education (Up1 ) decreases. At equilibrium by definition the optimal tax
equalises the marginal utility of both arguments (Up1 = U
p
2 ), which means that
the marginal utility of the numeraire falls (thus the numeraire consumption
has to increase) and so the tax drops.
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C Proof of proposition (2)
If bωL = bω, nobody uses the voucher, nv = 0 and Xp = ωtnvgnp . The number of
students attending public school could not be lower than in equilibrium in the
no-voucher case, which implies that gnp ≥ gnvnnvp . This make public school
(weakly) less attractive than in the no-voucher case, thus all the households
with income ω > bω (who were already preferring the private system) confirm
their choice. If XR Âω XP for all ω > bω, then gnvnnvp = gnp and thus
Xvp = Xp and we are back to the equilibrium case without vouchers.
Finally, it cannot be that bωL > bω. This would result in nv = 0 and
gvnvp = gnp; this would imply that XnvP = XP and so that bωL = bω, which is
a contradiction. This proves that always bωL ≤ bω.
D Proof of proposition (3)
XP > XnvP ⇐ bωR > bω: if bωR > bω , agents in the interval (bω; bωR) are attend-
ing public school in presence of vouchers while they were attending private
schools before. The introduction of vouchers does not imply changes in the
disposable income of agents with income above bω, thus the original consump-
tion bundle remains aﬀordable. By the WARP, if we observe a change in this
agents’ behaviour, it must be that the new bundle is preferred. Since the
numeraire consumption is constant, it must be that the quality of school
consumed increased, thus XP > XR > XnvP .
XnvP = XP ⇒ bωR = bω: when XnvP = XP , for agents in (bω;ωmax] nothing
has changed. By simply replacing XP by XnvP in (6) we are back to the
condition in (3) and thus, by definition, the solution of the problem is bω.
XP > XnvP ⇒ bωR > bω: by definition, bωR is the level of income for which
the left and right hand sides of equation (6) are equal. For XnvP = XP thenbωR = bω. Increasing XP , public school becomes more attractive (i.e. the right
hand side is bigger than the left one). Only an increase in the level of income
can re-establish the equality. Such an increase leads to a higher consumption
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of the numeraire both in case of consumption of public school and of the
private one; given the concavity of the utility function, the marginal increase
is higher on the left hand side than on the right one, which insures that for
a suﬃciently large increase in bωR, the equality holds again.
E Proof of proposition (4)
By proposition (2), bωL cannot be greater than bω. Two diﬀerent scenarios are
possible: bωL = bω or bωL < bω.
Proof by contradiction. Suppose bωL < bω and XP ≤ XnvP : by proposition
(3), bωR = bω and thus a) np = (np(tnv) − nv), b) ωmed is decisive, c) t > tnv
and d) g < gnv (since bωL < bω).
Then "
tnv
gnvnnvp
−
Ã
t− nvnnvp t
nv
gnp
!#
ω > 0
a necessary condition for that (since t > tnv) is npg+ nvgnv > nnvp gnv.For
this to be true it must be that g > gnv which is impossible.
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